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Jonathan H. Adler*

INTRODUCTION: PROPERTY IN ECOLOGY
Are property rights in ecological resources compatible with environmental
protection? Might they be essential?
From the late nineteenth century to the present, leading conservationists
and environmental thinkers have warned of the threat posed to ecological
sustainability by private property rights, particularly where embedded within a
system of market exchange.1 Pervasive ecological interconnection has often been
viewed as fundamentally incompatible with the private division and segmentation
of the landscape into separately divisible private tracts.2
The nation’s first national forest reserves were created in 1891 to protect
against the threat of market-driven over-consumption.3 The early push for greater
federal ownership and management of resource-abundant lands by the likes of
Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot was fed by persistent fears of timber
shortages due to the rapacious resource consumption of timber companies and
private forest owners.4 At the turn of the last century, President Roosevelt warned:
“If the present rate of forest destruction is allowed to continue, with nothing to
offset it, a timber famine in the future is inevitable.”5 Pinchot, the father of the
United States Forest Service, offered an equally dismal assessment: “The United
States has already crossed the verge of a timber famine so severe that its blighting
effects will be felt by every household in the land.”6 The answer, for Pinchot, was
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1. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, The Problem with Ploughshares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1992, at A27
(“Environmentalism’s essential message is that private ownership rights go too far”); Joseph L. Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 150 (1971) (suggesting environmental
protection requires “a reconsideration of the notion of property rights”); Rory O’Brien, Law Property,
and the Environment, in THINKING ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT: READINGS ON POLITICS, PROPERTY AND
THE PHYSICAL WORLD 57, 57 (Matthew Alan Cahn & Rory O’Brien eds., 1996) (“Defining property as
something that is privately held immediately impacts the environment.”).
2. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Constitutional Dimensions of Property: A Debate, 26 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 23, 32 (1992) (noting ecological interconnection presents “the most profound challenge ever
presented to established notions of property”); see also Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269 (1993).
3. See STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, NATURE’S KEEPERS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NATURE MANAGEMENT
55 (1995).
4. See ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILURE OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT 51-52 (1995).
5. See MICHAEL WILLIAMS, AMERICANS AND THEIR FORESTS: A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY 441
(1992) (quoting Roosevelt’s address at the 1905 American Forestry Congress).
6. See
GIFFORD
PINCHOT,
THE
FIGHT
FOR
CONSERVATION
(1910),
https://wwnorton.com/college/history/america-essential-learning/docs/GPinchot-Conservation-1910.pdf.
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“government control of cutting on all timberland, private as well as public.” The
private sector could not be trusted. Accordingly, President Roosevelt took
aggressive action (often without Congressional support) to expand federal land
management in the name of conservation.7
As federal land management responsibilities accumulated, expanding
beyond forests to include what would become National Parks, “the overriding
philosophy was one of saving resources from the rapaciousness of private
commercial interests.”8 Due to the perceived threat posed by private consumption,
conservation leaders “frequently supported public or social ownership of the
environment: the national park idea, for example, and federal control of dams or
major rivers.”9 As Pinchot would explain, “[w]e are coming to understand in this
country that public action for public benefit has a very much wider field to cover
and a much larger part to play than was the case when there were resources enough
for everyone.”10 Public ownership and control was prescribed to cure marketdriven scarcity.
Skepticism of property rights continued to influence the development of
environmental policy throughout much of the Twentieth Century. As governments
at all levels adopted more expansive environmental regulatory measures in the
1960s and 1970s, there was a particular focus on the potential threat property
rights, and the constitutional protection thereof, could pose to the achievement of
environmental goals.11 As a Presidential Task Force advised in 1973, in order to
“protect critical environmental and cultural areas, tough restrictions will have to be
placed on the use of privately owned land.”12
Although many environmental thought leaders have been skeptical of
property-based institutions, there is a strong tradition in the United States of
utilizing private property for conservation purposes.13 The same period that saw a

7. See Julia L. Ernst, The Legacy of Theodore Roosevelt’s Approach to Governmental Powers, 92
N.D. L. REV. 309, 318-20 (2017).
8. See BUDIANSKY, supra note 3, at 142; see also THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THEODORE
ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 422 (1985 ed. 1913) (“The Conservation movement was a direct
outgrowth of the forest movement. It was nothing more than the application to our other natural
resources of the principles which had been worked out in connection with the forests. Without the basis
of public sentiment which had been built up for the protection of the forests, and without the example of
public foresight in the protection of this, one of the greatest natural resources, the Conservation
movement would have been impossible.”).
9. Roderick Frazier Nash, The Potential of Environmental History, in AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTALISM: READINGS IN CONSERVATION HISTORY 4 (3d ed. 1990).
10. See PINCHOT, supra note 6 (“We are coming to understand in this country that public action for
public benefit has a very much wider field to cover and a much larger part to play than was the case
when there were resources enough for every one.”); JOHN T. CUMBLER, NORTHEAST AND MIDWEST
UNITED STATES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 238 (ABC-CLIO, 2005).
11. See Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property
Rights and Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 988, 993-1001 (2005).
12. THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZEN’S POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 23 (William K. Reilly ed.,
1973).
13. See Council on Envtl. Quality, Special Report: The Public Benefits of Private Conservation, in
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1984 (1984) (surveying history of private conservation in the United
States); see also Andrew P. Morriss, Private Conservation Literature: A Survey, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J.
621 (2004).
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Progressive push for greater federal land ownership and resource management was
witness to a dramatic expansion of private conservation activity. Roosevelt himself,
who was heavily influenced by Pinchot and oversaw the creation of the U.S. Forest
Service, had a hand in creating the Boone and Crockett Club in 1887.14 The first
local Audubon Society was founded in 1886, and, in 1905, the National Committee
of Audubon Societies (which would eventually become the National Audubon
Society) was born.15 Audubon sought to preserve essential habitat for bird species
through direct ownership. This often included targeting lands deemed valueless, or
even dangerous, by government experts, such as “swamps.”16
While Audubon was building its network of reserves, the federal
government was subsidizing wetland destruction.17 Similarly, while the federal
government was encouraging the slaughter of buffalo, foresighted conservationists
used private ownership as a means to preserve the American bison.18 As
conservationist Valerius Geist observed, “Bison were initially saved by six
individuals who either saw business opportunities in the existence of bison or
simply wanted to save a vanishing species.”19 Private conservation preserved what
government management would have slighted.
The expansion of environmental regulation in the last third of the
twentieth century did not diminish the importance of private conservation in
America. To the contrary, private conservation has continued to expand, in some
cases filling the gaps and interstices left within the regulatory regimes. The
American Prairie Reserve is but one example of a non-governmental organization
using private ownership to extend conservation beyond governmental efforts.20 It is
now increasingly common for environmental experts to acknowledge the “many
exciting possibilities for using property concepts to further the protection of
environmental resources.”21

14. See PAUL RUSSELL CUTRIGHT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: THE MAKING OF A CONSERVATIONIST
167-69 (1985) (discussing the founding of the Boone & Crockett Club). On Roosevelt’s embrace of
conservation, see ROOSEVELT, supra note 8.
15. See FRANK GRAHAM JR. & CARL W. BUCHEISTER, THE AUDUBON ARK: A HISTORY OF THE
AUDUBON SOCIETY (1st ed. 1990).
16. See BUDIANSKY, supra note 3, at 28 (“What we today admire as ‘wetlands’ were once
‘swamps,’ or even, in the words of the eighteenth-century naturalist Georges Leclerc, the Comte do
Buffon, ‘putrid and stagnating waters.”). As Budiansky notes, eighteenth-century naturalists such as
Leclerc often has similarly negative views of forests. Id.
17. See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 19-20 (1999).
18. See generally ANDREW C. ISENBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BISON: AN ENVIRONMENTAL
HISTORY 164-92 (2000); Ike C. Sugg, Why the Buffalo Roam, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Jan. 31,
2000), https://cei.org/news-letters-cei-planet/why-buffalo-roam; see also STEFAN BECHTEL, MR.
HORNADAY’S WAR: HOW A PECULIAR VICTORIAN ZOOKEEPER WAGED A LONELY CRUSADE FOR
WILDLIFE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2012).
19. Sugg, supra note 18.
20. See James L. Huffman, American Prairie Reserve Protecting Wildlife Habitat on a Grand
Scale, 59 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35 (2019).
21. Carol Rose, Property Rights and Responsibilities, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT
GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 49, 57 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997); see
also Nancy A. McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands, 38
IDAHO L. REV.. 453, 459 (2002) (noting the “increasing recognition of the need for non-regulatory
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Working at the local level, conservationists have often rediscovered Aldo
Leopold’s counsel that private rights can be more effective than government
regulation.22 Conservation goals have been dramatically enhanced by the growth of
land trusts23 and increasing use of property instruments such as conservation
easements.24 Land ownership in fee simple is one way a conservation organization
may protect a particular place, but it is hardly necessary in many contexts.
Conservation easements and other partial interests in land are often a highly costeffective alternative, particularly where conservation is compatible with other landuses.25 Over the past several decades, the use of such tools has expanded
dramatically, facilitated by legal reforms that have facilitated and encouraged such
efforts.26
The ecological value of ownership is found not only in land, but in water
as well.27 Western water law traditionally required landowners to make “productive
use” of water rights to retain them, such as by diverting water for agriculture or
approaches to private land conservation”); Federico Cheever, Property Rights and the Maintenance of
Wildlife Habitat: The Case for Conservation Land Transactions, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 431 (2002) (arguing
that “some of the inherent qualities of the legal institutions we call property make that type of institution
more suitable for the maintenance of wildlife habitat than the legal institutions we call regulation”);
James L. Huffman, Marketing Biodiversity, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 421 (2002) (“Only recently have some
mainstream environmental groups embraced the idea that property rights and private markets can
promote environmental protection.”).
22. Aldo Leopold, Conservation Economics, in THE RIVER OF THE MOTHER OF GOD AND OTHER
ESSAYS 193, 193-94 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird Callicott eds, 1991) (“We tried to get conservation by
buying land, by subsidizing desirable changes in land use, and by passing restrictive laws. The last
method largely failed; the other two have produced some small samples of success.”). Leopold further
suggested that private conservation was preferable to government acquisition of land for conservation
purposes. Id. at 196. (“I do challenge the growing assumption that bigger buying [of public land] is a
substitute for private conservation practice.”). Id.
23. See generally Jessica Owley & Adena R. Rissman, Trends in Private Land Conservation:
Increasing Complexity, Shifting Conservation Purposes and Allowable Private Land Uses, 51 LAND
USE POL’Y 76, 76-77 (2016) (discussing growth in land trusts); see also RICHARD BREWER,
CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (2003).
24. See Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good: Preserving the
Environment on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373 (2001); Gerald Korngold, Privately Held
Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements,
63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984).
25. See, e.g., Dominic Parker, Land Trusts and the Choice to Conserve Land with Full Ownership
or Conservation Easements, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 483, 516 (2004) (explaining that conservation
easements “better facilitate gains from [landowner] specialization” because they can “conserve
environmental amenities while continuing to allow landowners the right to produce non-conservation
output” and that such arrangements can be “especially cost-effective”). Of course, conservation
easements, like any policy tool, are not without their potential drawbacks. See, e.g., Julia D. Mahoney,
The Illusion of Perpetuity and the Preservation of Privately Owned Lands, 44 NAT. RESOURCE J. 573
(2004) (suggesting that perpetual land preservation could frustrate conservation in the future as
environmental priorities change over time); Jamie Sayen, Limitations of Conservation Easements, WILD
EARTH, Spring 1996, at 77 (suggesting that fee simple ownership provides greater protection for some
resources than a conservation easement).
26. See Owley & Rissman, supra note 23, at 77.
27. See Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax, The “Shift to Privatization” in Land Conservation: A
Cautionary Essay, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 599, 600 (2002) (“[P]roperty rights are being created to
address new environmental challenges, like air and water pollution, that previously have been regulated
in a less market-based, more command-and-control manner.”).
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livestock. This requirement was intended to ensure that scarce water was used in
(what were historically considered to be) socially beneficial uses.28 A landowner
who left her water in the stream for the benefit of fish or other species risked losing
her water rights to those who used water for irrigation or drinking.29 By limiting the
marketability of water, the traditional legal regime diminished the incentives to
increase water efficiency and obstructed conservation efforts.30
Over the past few decades, however, this has begun to change as states
have begun to embrace a broader conception of property in water, and recognize
property interests in instream water flows.31 Oregon, for example, allows
individuals to purchase, lease, or donate water rights for instream flows.32 This
enables conservation organizations, such as Oregon’s Oregon Water Trust, “to use
the marketplace to purchase existing water rights and convert them” for the benefit
of fish.33 The recognition of legally defensible property rights in instream flows
means there is a broader market for water, and conservation organizations may
negotiate with existing water owners for voluntary transfers, increasing the
incentive for more efficient water use.34 As the use of water rights has expanded, so
has the volume of water traded and reallocated to alternative uses.35 The ability of
water markets to facilitate the efficient and relatively rapid reallocation of water in
response to changing ecological conditions is also now seen as one way to address
some of the likely consequences of climate change.36
The rediscovery of the ecological value of property rights should not come
as a surprise. As the late Robert Nelson observed, “the great advantage of
privatization is that it creates a set of people with strong personal stakes in
achieving good results on the land.”37 Wendell Berry, though not a proponent of

28. See Michael C. Blumm, Unconventional Waters: The Quiet Revolution in Federal and Tribal
Minimum Streamflows, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 445, 446 n.1 (1992) ( “Limiting water rights to those who
could make productive use of the water--and only for as long as they did so (nonuse can lead to loss of
the right through abandonment or forfeiture)--was designed to conserve scarce Western water for those
who were making productive investments such as irrigation, mining, and stock watering.”).
29. Id. at 480; see also TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-CAPITALISTS: DOING
GOOD BY DOING WELL 105 (1997).
30. See Christopher L. Len, Synthesis - A Brand New Water Law, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 55,
64 (2004) (discussing the effects of prior appropriation doctrine on water use); see also James L.
Huffman, Water Marketing in Western Prior Appropriation States: A Model for the East, 21 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 429, 438 (2004).
31. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE
PUMP 111-32 (1997); see also Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Terry Anderson, Principles for
Water, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 335 (2002); Janet Neuman, Anne Squier & Gail Achterman, Sometimes a
Great Notion: Oregon’s Instream Flow Experiments, 36 ENVTL. L. 1125 (2006).
32. Neuman, Squier & Achterman supra note 31 (discussing evolution of water law in Oregon).
33. See Janet C. Neuman, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The First Ten Years of the Oregon
Water Trust, 83 NEB. L. REV. 432 (2004) (discussing the work of the Oregon Water Trust and its
history).
34. See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 29, at 94-95.
35. See Jedidiah Bewer, et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 1987-2005, 40 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 1021, 1042, fig.2 (2007) (documenting increase in water transfers over time).
36. See Jonathan H. Adler, Water Rights, Markets, and Changing Ecological Conditions, 42 ENVTL
L. 93, 106-12 (2012).
37. NELSON, supra note 4.
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classical liberal values or free market capitalism, nonetheless recognized that “the
best conserver of land in use will always be the small owner or operator, farmer or
forester or both, who lives within a securely placed family and community, who
knows how to use the land in the best way, and who can afford to do so.”38 He
similarly counseled that “a large population of small property holders” offers the
best hope for “good stewardship of land.”39
There is significant empirical evidence that greater protection of private
property rights correlates with higher levels of environmental quality. Comparative
assessments of privately and publicly owned resources, such as oyster beds, tend to
find private owners manage resources more efficiently and effectively.40 Crosscountry comparisons find that “environmental quality and economic growth rates
are greater in regimes where property rights are well defined than in regimes where
property rights are poorly defined.”41 As a general matter, those natural resources
subject to property institutions are managed more sustainably and in better
condition than those subject to political management or left in open-access
commons.
The empirical evidence confirms one of the more important, and often
overlooked, insights of Garrett Hardin’s seminal essay, “The Tragedy of the
Commons.”42 This essay is often remembered for its justification for environmental
regulation – what he termed “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” (or for
Hardin’s concerns about population growth).43 What is too often forgotten was his
explanation of how the recognition of property rights in ecological resources
facilitates conservation.
In his essay, Hardin described the fate of the “commons,” an unowned,
open-access pasture used for grazing livestock.44 As Hardin explained, it is in the
self-interest of each livestock owner to maximize her use of the commons, even
though doing so may increase the depletion of the underlying resource. Each
livestock owner captures that full benefit of putting an additional animal out to
graze. The costs to the resource, however, are distributed among all of the users.
Put another way, due to the open-access nature of the commons, the benefits of
using the pasture are privatized, while the costs are socialized. This dynamic,
Hardin explained, “brings ruin to all.”45
38. See Wendell Berry, Private Property and the Common Wealth, in ANOTHER TURN OF THE
CRANK 59 (1995). It is important to note, however, that Berry does not endorse a classical liberal
conception of property. See Nathaniel Stewart, The Tragedy of the Commonwealth and the Vision of
Wendell Berry, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 465 (2006).
39. Berry, supra note 38, at 49.
40. See Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelly, Property Rights and Efficiency in the Oyster
Industry, 18 J. L. & ECON. 521 (1975); Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelly, Prices and
Property Rights in the Fisheries, 42.2 S. ECON. J. 253 (1979). For a survey of other comparative
analyses, see Louis De Alessi, Gains from Private Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION,
CONFLICT, AND LAW 90-111 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003).
41. See Seth W. Norton, Property Rights, the Environment, and Economic Well-Being, in WHO
OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 51 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998).
42. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
43. Id. at 1247.
44. Id. at 1244.
45. Id.
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It’s worth reiterating that Hardin was not the first to explain this
phenomenon. Fishery economists detailed and documented this precise problem in
the marine commons decades earlier.46 Aristotle also described the general
dynamic, as did others in between.47 Yet Hardin’s essay is important because it
popularized the idea of the “tragedy of the commons,” and helped inform the
emerging environmentalist moment in American politics.
Hardin’s call for controlling access and limiting the use of common
resources – land, water, air – reinforced the push for greater environmental
regulation. What is too-often overlooked is that Hardin offered an alternative to
prescriptive government regulation: private property. As he explained, the tragedy
of the commons “is averted by private property, or something formally like it.”48
Indeed, Hardin suggested this was one of the primary functions of property in
land.49
As Hardin recognized, where property rights are well-defined and secure,
the tragedy of the commons is less likely since each owner has ample incentive to
act as a steward, caring for the underlying resource and preventing its overuse
which then benefits both the owners as well as others who may value the
underlying resource. In this way, the institution of property rights “deters us from
exhausting the positive resources of the earth.”50
Fisheries provide a useful case study of the logic of the commons and the
value of property institutions. Following World War II, ecologists began to
recognize that the ocean’s bounty, once seen as limitless, was under strain.
Beginning in the 1950s, fishery economists explained how this was an inevitable
consequence of the open-access nature of marine resources. Further, as Hardin
would later suggest, they recognized property rights as a solution.51
The development of ITQs (for “individual transferable quotas”) and other
forms of property-based fishery management systems, known as catch shares,
many marine fisheries once threatened with collapse are on the road to
sustainability.52 The adoption of such programs has increased fishing industry
efficiency, reduced over-capitalization, and lessened the ecological impact of

46. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The
Fishery, 62(2) J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole
Ownership, 63(2) J. POL ECON. 116 (1955).
47. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS § 1261.b32, at 108 (Trevor J. Saunders ed., T.A. Sinclair
trans., Penguin Classics rev. ed. 1981) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
48. Hardin, supra note 42, at 1245.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See FRANCIS T. CHRISTY, FISHERMEN QUOTAS: A TENTATIVE SUGGESTION FOR DOMESTIC
MANAGEMENT (1973). This history is summarized in Ragnar Arnason, Property Rights in Fisheries:
How Much Can Individual Transferable Quotas Accomplish?, 6(2) REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 217
(2012).
52. See Christopher Costello, Steven D. Gaines, & John Lynham, Can Catch Shares Prevent
Fisheries Collapse?, 321 SCI. 1678 (2008) (noting the adoption of catch-share programs “halts, and
even reverses, the global trend toward widespread [fisheries] collapse”).
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fishing operations.53 Such programs cover only two percent or so of fish stocks
around the world, but as of 2010 accounted for approximately twenty-five percent
of the volume of fish caught annually worldwide.54 Another study, surveying over
200 peer-reviewed papers on the environmental effects of ITQ programs, found
that the creation of property rights in ocean fisheries encourages greater
stewardship among fishery participants, including efforts to maintain and enforce
sustainable limits on the total catch.55 Fishery participants under ITQs often exhibit
greater concern for ensuring total catch levels remain sustainable and that
applicable limits are enforced than the government officials charged with such
obligations.
The experience with fisheries suggests the value of learning how property
rights may be extended to threatened ecological resources, particularly those we
wish to simultaneously exploit and conserve. The experience also suggests how
challenging such efforts can be. Only decades after fishery economists began to
identify potential mechanisms for the extension of property rights to fisheries did
such reforms begin to get adopted, and only recently – in the past decade or so –
has conclusive empirical evidence on the value of these approaches emerged.
Following this model for other resources will take no less effort, and the
vindication of classical liberal ideas about how to protect other resources is by no
means assured.
While Hardin embraced the conservation potential of property rights in
principle, he was not altogether sanguine about the potential for property rights to
avert the tragedy of the commons across the board. However much property rights
led to increased conservation and agricultural productivity on land, Hardin feared
that it would be difficult to define and defend property rights in other ecological
contexts.56 It is one thing to post and fence private land. It is quite another to
demarcate property rights in air or water or to prevent the overuse of such resources
as pollution sinks by ever-growing populations.57
Embracing Hardin’s analysis does not require embracing his pessimistic
outlook. Much has changed in the half-century since Hardin wrote, and there are
many reasons to be more bullish about the potential for property in ecology. As the
experience with rights in water and fisheries noted above highlights,58 institutional
evolution, aided by technological innovation, can facilitate the recognition and
protection of property rights in ecologically important resources and produce
conservation benefits.59
53. The relevant literature is summarized in Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Learning How
to Fish: Catch Shares and the Future of Fishery Conservation, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 150
(2013).
54. See Christopher Costello et al., Economic Incentives and Global Fisheries Sustainability, 2
ANN. REV. RES. ECON. 299, 302 (2010).
55. Trevor A. Branch, How Do Individual Transferable Quotas Affect Marine Ecosystems?, 10
FISH & FISHERIES 39 (2009).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
59. See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice Among
Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 128-29 (2001) (explaining
how changes in technology can facilitate the definition and enforcement of property rights); see
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Yet Hardin was no doubt correct that the extension of property-based
institutions to a wider array of ecological resources is a serious challenge.
Demarcating boundaries on land is easier than delineating rights in water. A given
parcel can generally be relied upon to remain in place. Living resources, including
wildlife, not so much. As a consequence, property rights in ecological resources are
incomplete. In some cases, ownership of resources is prohibited by law. In other
cases, the transaction costs of extending well defined, defensible, and divestible
property rights appear greater than the benefits to be gained.
The papers in this volume explore the further potential for property-based
institutions to preserve environmental values and enhance environmental
protection. Through case studies, empirical assessments, and consideration of the
institutional constraints that may alternatively facilitate or hamper private
conservation efforts, these papers deepen our understanding of the institutional
context in which conservation occurs and the potential for property-based
approaches to supplement, if not supplant, traditional government management of
natural resources and environmental regulation. Together, they aim to enhance the
conservation potential of property institutions by looking at how such institutions
may be extended and defended so as to maximize property’s ecological potential.
Government agencies may seem to have a comparative advantage at
landscape-scale conservation ̶ perhaps. But the work of the American Prairie
Reserve (“APR”) might suggest otherwise.60 Just as the early Audubon Society
conserved areas often left unprotected by governments at the time, the APR is well
on its way to creating the largest nature reserve in the country by acquiring land
from willing sellers. At the same time, APR is modifying the management of
federally owned lands by seeking to acquire and retire grazing permits.
One purpose of land conservation is to preserve habitat and intact
ecosystems. Another is to provide for recreational opportunities. The latter need not
require the acquisition of land in fee-simple, or even the purchase of a permanent
conservation easement. The combination of private ownership and modern
technology may facilitate temporary leases or access rights so as to enable a “right
to roam” across private lands – what some might think of as the environmental
equivalent of Airbnb.61
Water may be more difficult to own than land, as discussed above. Yet the
application of property rights principles to water has produced conservation gains.
This is even true where such rights are incomplete or where transaction costs
inhibit the transfer of existing rights. The Colorado Water Conservation Board
(“CWCB”) has been able to work within the existing water right structure to
enhance stream protection within the state, even though significant obstacles to
water transfers remain.62

generally THE TECHNOLOGY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 2001)
(same).
60. See Huffman, supra note 20.
61. See generally Donald J. Kochan, The Market to Roam: Using Shared Economy Platforms for
Expanding Roaming Access to Land Resources, 59 NAT. RESOURCES J. 89 (2019).
62. See Steven M. Smith, Instream Flow Rights within the Prior Appropriation Doctrine: Insights
from Colorado, 59 NAT. RESOURCES J. 181 (2019).
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As the activities of the CWCB and APR both demonstrate, private owners
are not necessarily the only players within a property rights framework.
Government agencies may continue to own ecological resources and use property
institutions to advance broader public or political goals. Yet just because lands or
waters are characterized as belonging to the state does not make it so and claims of
state “ownership” should be approached with caution, not least because of the
state’s dual role as owner and regulator.63
State laws and regulations often determine what sorts of property rights
will be recognized and, in particular, whether “non-use” rights in ecological
resources are possible. It took decades for such rights in water – instream rights –
to obtain legal recognition, and there are still obstacles to the recognition of
equivalent rights in other contexts. As a consequence, the limitation on non-use
rights in ecological resources remains a major challenge for property-based
preservation.64
At the same time that recognition of non-use rights is important, so, too, is
careful consideration of what uses interfere with the property rights of others. For
decades, the dominant environmental paradigm has focused on the idea of
“externalities” – the “external” effects one person’s use of her property may have
on that of another – and the use of government interventions (such as taxes or
regulations) to “internalize” such costs. Yet due to pervasive ecological
interconnection, the idea of externalities threatens to swallow the very property
rights foundation upon which it sits, necessitating a more careful and principled
application of this essential concept.65
Private property has an essential role to play in environmental
conservation. Yet as this essay and the accompanying papers show, there are many
areas in which the precise role for property has yet to be defined or may seem out
of reach. Important questions remain about the best set of institutional
arrangements and legal rules to facilitate the extension and preservation of property
rights without compromising efficiency or equity. Such “second generation”
questions are an important as ever and command the attention of those interested in
property-based environmental protection.66
Environmental protection is necessarily a work in progress – as it has
always been and always will be. Human civilization inevitably produces untoward
environmental consequences. Changes in scientific understanding and social values
also change what types and degrees of environmental protection people demand
over time. Property rights have an important role to play in this process, and
continuing research on property rights questions is necessary if people are to have
the opportunity to achieve the types of environmental protection they deserve.

63. See Joseph Regalia & Noah D. Hall, “Waters of the State”, 59 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59 (2019).
64. See Bryan Leonard & Shawn Regan, Legal and Institutional Barriers to Establishing Non-Use
Rights to Natural Resources, 59 NAT. RESOURCES J. 135 (2019).
65. See Donald J. Boudreaux & Roger Meiners, Externality: Origins and Classifications, 59 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1 (2019).
66. See Katrina M. Wyman, Second Generation Property Rights Issues, 59 NAT. RESOURCES J. 215
(2019).

